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ABSTRACT 
 
Using an experiment with corporate financial managers (e.g., CFOs, controllers), we find that 
when red flags are present in the financial statements under their review, managers identify those 
red flags and, in turn, have greater concerns over earnings quality. In addition, when pressure to 
meet a financial target is high, managers are more concerned about earnings quality when red 
flags are present. We also document that when red flags are present, managers are more likely to 
report both internally to their CEO and, if their concerns are not resolved internally, externally to 
their auditor. Pressure to meet a financial target directly influenced the decision to report 
internally, but not externally. Additional analyses contemplate the countervailing personal costs 
associated with reporting or not reporting earnings quality concerns. We demonstrate the 
important role short-term costs play in external reporting decisions. Finally, we provide initial 
evidence that corporate managers with a longer tenure at their position (public accounting 
background) are less (more) likely to report externally. 
 
Keywords: earnings management, earnings quality, fraud, red flags, reporting, whistleblowing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
Earnings management is a “phenomenon that ranges from legitimate managerial activities 
at one end of the spectrum to fraudulent financial reporting at the other” (POB 2000).  Dichev et 
al. (2013) demonstrate that Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) acknowledge that earnings 
management occurs and that CFOs are able to list red flags that signal earnings management. 
Many of the red flags listed by the CFOs (e.g., high accruals) are associated with incidences of 
extreme earnings management or fraudulent financial reporting (hereafter, “fraud”) (Dechow et 
al. 2011; Gullkvist and Jokipii 2013).1 Given 1) CFOs are financial gatekeepers who possess 
knowledge of fraud red flags, and 2) it is possible for frauds to arise without the CFO’s initial 
involvement (e.g., at a division/regional level, directed by the CEO/prior CFO, etc.), it is 
important to understand if, and to what extent, these managers react to red flags in the financial 
statements their companies prepare for external parties.  
While we are not aware of a definitive rate at which frauds do not initially emanate from 
the CFO, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2016) report that 65% of its cases of 
financial statement fraud were perpetrated outside the realm of executives/upper management 
(e.g., perpetrated in the Sales department). Beasley et al. (2010) find that, based on SEC 
enforcement releases, 35% of cases do not name the CFO as being associated with the fraud. 
Feng et al. (2011) observe that 40% of SEC enforcement releases do not name the CFO and 
conclude from their analyses “that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations 
because they succumb to pressure from CEOs.” High profile frauds that emanated either above 
or below the CFO include Parmalat, Satyam, Xerox, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, Global Crossing, 
                                                 
1 Our experimental study manipulates red flags at levels observed by prior research that has examined fraudulent 
companies (e.g., Brazel et al. 2009), but does not include the actual detection of fraud. Thus, we use “extreme 
earnings management” and “potential fraud” interchangeably. 
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JDN Reality, Solectron, and Thor Industries. In addition, our discussion also relates to CFOs 
hired during the course of a multi-year fraud (e.g., HealthSouth, Livent). Indeed, CFOs note that 
a change in financial management is a signal that can be used to detect earnings management 
(see Table 14 in Dichev et al. 2013) and Feng et al (2011) observe that CFOs are apt to leave 
their companies prior to periods of accounting manipulation. Last, a fraud could emanate from an 
acquired company or prior to a merger (e.g., Cendant).2  
In this study, we explore a commonly occurring context where the CFO (“manager”) is 
reviewing consolidated financial statements prepared by a corporate controller. The task of 
preventing and detecting potential frauds in organizations lies with the company’s management 
team, and management review is a primary way in which frauds are detected (e.g., IAASB 2009; 
AICPA 2015;ACFE 2016). Consistent with Dyck et al. (2010) who find employees often play a 
key role in fraud detection, a recent study reports that employees are the source of over 50% of 
fraud tips (ACFE 2016). Consequently, it is important not only to understand whether managers 
are able to recognize the red flags that indicate potential fraud, but also whether they are apt to 
respond to such risks by reporting concerns to the appropriate party(ies).  
We investigate whether managers’ concerns over earnings quality increase when red 
flags are present in the financial statements under their review. We also examine whether 
managers report their concerns about the quality of earnings when confronted with red flags. 
Specifically, when red flags are present, are managers inclined to report concerns internally 
within the company (e.g., to their CEO)? Subsequently, if their concerns are not resolved within 
the company, are they apt to report their concerns externally (e.g., to their external auditor)? 
                                                 
2 For an illustration of our setting, see the following description of the fraud at Livent 
(https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/former-livent-cfo-numb-over-extent-of-
fraud/article17987583). 
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Finally, if red flags are present in a scenario where the company faces pressure to meet a 
financial target, does such pressure further increase managers’ concerns over earnings quality 
and/or impact the likelihood of reporting such concerns? 
We conduct an experiment with 204 corporate financial managers (e.g., CFOs, 
controllers) from Italian companies. To our knowledge, we are the first study to engage corporate 
managers in an experiment that examines their reactions to red flags indicative of extreme 
earnings management and/or a potential fraud.3 Prior research has identified multiple red flags 
that indicate an increased likelihood of earnings management and/or fraud (e.g., Beasley 1996; 
Dechow et al. 2011; Dichev et al. 2013; Gullkvist and Jokipii 2013). In addition, the CFOs in 
Dichev et al. (2013) list avoiding the violation of debt covenants as a pressure that motivates 
earnings management (see also and Dechow et al. 1996; Graham et al. 2005). Informed by this 
literature, our experiment manipulates the presence of red flags in the financial statements 
(present or not present) and the pressure to meet a debt covenant (higher or lower).  
Participants were asked to assume the role of CFO of a manufacturing company and to 
conduct a preliminary review of the company’s consolidated financial statements. They were 
also informed that the corporate controller (working directly under them) was primarily 
responsible for preparing the financial statements. Following the case information, participants 
were asked questions about the financial statements they reviewed and the actions they would 
take based on their review. Finally, participants responded to demographic questions. 
                                                 
3 Reporting concerns over unethical/illegal acts, including financial statement fraud, is a global concern that has led 
standard setters across the world to take action to improve reporting (e.g., Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. and the 
Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations Pronouncement issued by IESBA) (Verschoor 2012; 
IFAC 2016). The examination of Italian CFOs represents a rich context to study corporate manager concerns over 
financial reporting quality. Callao and Jarne (2010) report that earnings management has intensified since the 
adoption of IFRS in Europe as discretionary accruals have increased in the periods following adoptions. For a 
discussion of earnings management in European private firms see Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) and see 
Leoni and Florio (2015) for a comparative history of the US and Italian earnings management literatures.  
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We find that when red flags are present, managers identify those red flags and, in turn, 
have greater concerns over earnings quality. When pressure to meet a debt covenant is higher 
(versus lower), we observe that participants are more concerned about earnings quality when 
reviewing financial statements exhibiting red flags. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
pressure to meet financial targets is a root cause of fraud (e.g., the fraud triangle (Cressey 1953)) 
and managed earnings (Dichev et al. 2013). We also document that when red flags are present, 
managers are more likely to report both internally to their CEO and, if their concerns are not 
resolved internally, externally to their auditor. Although pressure to meet a financial target 
directly impacts reporting internally, it does not moderate the positive relations we observe 
between the presence of red flags and the likelihood of reporting internally and externally.  
In supplemental analyses, we consider the countervailing short-term and long-term 
personal costs of reporting and not reporting earnings quality concerns. We find that when 
pressure is high and red flags are present, managers perceive a substantial short-term cost to their 
career if they are somehow deemed responsible for an adjustment to earnings. As such, they are 
less likely to report their earnings quality concerns to their external auditor. We do not find that 
the long-term costs of not reporting (long-term career and litigation concerns) impact the 
decision to report externally. Last, we provide initial evidence that corporate managers with a 
longer tenure at their position (public accounting background) are less (more) likely to report 
externally. 
Our study makes important contributions to the literature. Dichev et al. (2013) note that 
“there is considerable potential for further research into the detection of opportunistic earnings 
management.” Given that corporate financial managers are arguably the guardians of earnings 
quality, it is important to consider whether they 1) recognize red flags that signal a potential 
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issue with the financial statements, and 2) are willing to report their concerns about earnings 
quality. Dichev et al. (2013) have shown that CFOs are able to list the signs of earnings 
management. We extend this line of literature by testing whether these managers are also able to 
recognize when these red flags are present in financial statements under their review. 
Furthermore, since merely recognizing financial reporting issues is often viewed as an 
inadequate response (Scannel and Latour 2004), we provide initial insights into factors that 
impact the likelihood of reporting concerns both internally to the CEO and externally to the 
auditor. Importantly, we document the role short-term personal costs play in inhibiting external 
reporting decisions. Finally, to our knowledge, we are the first to investigate whether and how 
the pressure to meet a financial target impacts the willingness of management to report concerns 
over earnings quality. Such examinations are important given the significant costs of fraud to 
investors, creditors, firms, etc. (e.g., NASAA 2006; Karpoff et al. 2008; Beasley et al. 2010).   
Our results should be of interest to corporate managers, those charged with governance, 
regulators, auditors, standard setters, and debt and equity market participants as they attempt to 
find ways to prevent and detect extreme earnings management/fraud. Given the crucial role 
employees play in reporting financial statement fraud (e.g., ACFE 2016; ACFE 2014; Dyck et al. 
2010), understanding the propensity of managers to act is particularly important. Our findings 
contribute to the whistleblowing literature by highlighting the ability of corporate managers to 
identify and report earnings quality concerns when red flags are present in financial statements. 
Our results are promising in that managers recognize red flags. However, even when red flags 
are present and pressure is higher, we observe only a moderate likelihood that managers will 
report concerns to an external party. Even in extreme conditions, managers are hesitant to blow 
the whistle externally.    
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  This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the theory and hypotheses. 
Sections 3 and 4 describe the research method and results, respectively. The final section 
provides conclusions. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1 Recognizing the signs of earnings management 
The task of preventing and detecting misstatements in the financial statements lies with 
company management (e.g., IAASB 2009; AICPA 2015; PCAOB 2015). Although CFO-level 
managers do not prepare financial statements, they are the financial gatekeepers and oversee the 
financial reporting process. These managers typically review the financial reporting package for 
reasonableness and accuracy (Feng et al. 2011; IFAC 2013). Given the breadth of knowledge 
necessary to fulfill their responsibilities, these managers commonly have a background in 
finance or accounting and/or a strong working knowledge of financing/operations (Dichev et al. 
2103). Since frauds often arise without the CFO’s initial involvement (e.g., Parmalat, Satyam, 
Xerox), it is important to understand if, and to what extent, these managers react to the presence 
of red flags in their company’s financial statements. In order to detect earnings management or 
fraud in financial statements, managers must first be able to recognize the signs (Gullkvist and 
Jokipii 2013).  
In a survey of U.S. CFOs, Dichev et al. (2013) asked the managers to list red flags that 
may be present when a company is misrepresenting their reported performance. Many of the red 
flags identified by the CFOs in the survey (e.g., high accruals) are also associated with 
incidences of fraudulent financial reporting (Dechow et al. 2011).4 However, the survey did not 
test whether the managers are able to actually identify red flags during the course of their review 
                                                 
4 Dichev et al. (2013) specifically excluded the examination of fraudulent financial reporting. 
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of the financial reporting package. Recent research has found that other players in the financial 
reporting process (i.e., auditors, retail investors) are not apt to detect such red flags (Brazel et al. 
2014; Brazel et al. 2016b). Still, given the expertise required to assume a financial management 
role and CFOs’ knowledge vis-à-vis red flags (Dichev et al. 2013), it is reasonable to expect that 
managers would be sensitive to red flags indicative of extreme earnings management. As such, 
we predict that managers will have greater concerns over earnings quality when red flags are 
present.5  
When the pressure to meet a financial target (e.g., debt covenant ratio, earnings forecast) 
is higher, the aforementioned positive relation between the presence of red flags and earnings 
quality concerns may be more acute for at least two reasons. First, according to attentional 
theories, pressure can increase attention and effort exerted while performing tasks (e.g., 
Baumeister 1984; Ashton 1990). Consistent with this, if a company is close to a financial target 
and pressure is higher, then managers may be more thorough in reviewing the financial reporting 
package.  
Second, managers may be more inclined to believe earnings management has occurred if 
a target has just been met because it is common practice to manage earnings to reach such targets 
(Dechow et al. 1996; Graham et al. 2005; Dichev et al. 2013;). A mature stream of literature in 
accounting documents the importance and regular occurrence of firms “meeting or just beating” 
financial targets (e.g., Burgstahler and Eames 2006). Meeting financial targets is of great concern 
                                                 
5 According to context theory, more than one cue may be needed to allow an information recipient to interpret a 
story, as individuals base their interpretations of a cue on the context in which the cue is presented. A single cue may 
have multiple interpretations depending on the context (Estes 1986; Medin et al. 1993; Medin and Schaffer 1978). In 
the context of fraud red flags, a single red flag may have a reasonable explanation, leaving room for ambiguity 
(Brazel et al. 2016b). However, when multiple red flags are present, which is typically the case with accounting 
fraud (e.g., Dechow et al. 2011; Hogan et al. 2008), this ambiguity is reduced. Consequently, in our study, we 
examine a situation where multiple red flags are present (versus not present) to reduce the level of ambiguity in 
relation to whether or not the financial statements are indicative of extreme earnings management or a potential 
fraud. 
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to managers, as evidenced by the negative market reaction to misses, managers’ preferences to 
sacrifice long-term value to reach targets, and fear of creditor interference due to debt covenant 
violations (e.g., Burgstahler et al. 2006; Graham et al. 2005). Thus, consistent with pressure to 
meet financial targets being a root cause of both fraud (e.g., the fraud triangle (Cressey 1953)) 
and managed earnings (Dichev et al. 2013), we expect that when pressure is higher, managers 
will be more concerned about earnings quality when reviewing financial statements exhibiting 
red flags. Hypotheses 1a and 1b, stated formally, are as follows:  
H1a: Managers have greater concerns over earnings quality when red flags are present 
(versus not present).   
 
H1b: The positive effect of red flags on managers’ concerns over earnings quality is 
stronger when the pressure to meet a financial target is higher (versus lower). 
 
2.2 Reporting concerns over earnings quality - internally and externally 
 Once red flags are detected in the financial statements, the manager must then decide 
whether or not to act on his/her concerns. According to Schultz et al. (1993), the willingness of 
individuals to report concerns over earnings quality is dependent upon the perceived seriousness 
of the irregularity, personal responsibility for reporting, and personal costs of reporting. 
Managers in a CFO-level position understand the gravity or seriousness of misrepresentations of 
financial statement information. Hennes et al. (2008) demonstrate that the turnover rate for CFOs 
involved in a restatement over an accounting irregularity is 85 percent. Feng et al. (2011) 
describe how CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in material accounting 
manipulations. Thus, if red flags indicative of potential fraud are present in the financial 
statements they are reviewing, CFOs should perceive this to be a serious irregularity.  
As discussed above, the financial statements typically fall within the purview of the 
corporate financial managers/CFOs, which should ensure a high level of personal responsibility 
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for reporting concerns over earnings quality (Feng et al. 2011). As such, when red flags are 
present in financial statements, this should result in both the seriousness and personal 
responsibility factors being high – in other words, the likelihood that the manager reports his/her 
concerns should increase. However, the personal costs associated with managers’ reporting 
concerns may be slightly more complex.  
 The CFO has an incentive to not report concerns internally. Given the responsibility the 
CFO has in leading the financial reporting process, he/she may view the indication of earnings 
quality issues as a failure of some sort in the system they manage (Feng et al. 2011). 
Nevertheless, a bigger or more costly risk to the CFO would likely be that a material 
misstatement in the financial statements is later discovered and comes as a surprise to their CEO. 
Indeed, the market’s reaction to restatements is often significantly negative (e.g., Myers et al. 
2013).  
By sharing their concerns with the CEO, which follows established lines of 
communication and authority, managers are able to keep the CEO apprised of the situation and 
may even view doing so as a shift in responsibility. Indeed, those reporting concerns over fraud 
are most likely to convey their concerns to their direct supervisor (Schultz et al. 1993; ACFE 
2016; IFAC 2016).6 Also, the CEO carries with him/her the same pressure to meet financial 
targets, but also produce reliable financial statements. As a result, when red flags are present, 
reporting concerns to the CEO may reduce the personal costs incurred by the CFO. 
                                                 
6 One of the most prominent instances of a manager reporting earnings quality concerns internally to the CEO is the 
case of Enron Vice President Sharon Watkins reporting her concerns to CEO Ken Lay (http://enron-online.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/watkinsmemo.pdf). Related to our examination of reporting externally in the event internal 
concerns are not placated (see H3a and H3b), some have criticized Watkins for not reporting her concerns externally 
after exhausting her internal efforts (http://www.forbes.com/2002/02/14/0214watkins.html). 
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Consequently, we predict that the presence of red flags results in managers being more likely to 
raise concerns internally to the CEO.  
The motivation to report concerns to the CEO may be particularly high when the pressure 
to meet financial targets is high and, in turn, the stakes are greater. Although market reactions to 
restatements are typically negative (e.g., Myers et al. 2013), a subsequent restatement that causes 
the company to miss a previously met financial target would likely compound this effect. If 
misstatements are later identified that coincide with just meeting a financial target, it is likely 
that the misstatements could be viewed as intentional by financial statement users and regulators 
(versus as a result of error) (Graham et al. 2005). The CFO is the leader of the accounting 
function (IFAC 2013), and company insurance policies do not cover firm management when 
courts find the firm guilty of fraud (Dyck et al. 2010). Thus, the personal costs to the manager of 
not reporting earnings quality concerns internally are even higher when there is pressure to meet 
a financial target. As a result, in higher-pressure settings, we expect managers who observe red 
flags to be even more likely to raise concerns to the CEO. Hypotheses 2a and 2b, stated formally, 
are as follows: 
H2a: Managers are more likely to report concerns over earnings quality internally when 
red flags are present (versus not present). 
 
H2b: The positive effect of red flags on managers reporting earnings quality concerns 
internally is stronger when the pressure to meet a financial target is higher (versus lower). 
 
If a manager raises concerns over earnings quality inside the company and those concerns 
are not adequately resolved, the manager must then decide whether or not to report the concerns 
externally.7 Managers are likely to consisder external control mechanisms when internal parties 
                                                 
7 Extant research suggests that managers are more apt to report concerns internally over externally (e.g., Robertson 
et al. 2011; Brink et al. 2013). Consistent with this notion, demographic data from our participants (presented in 
Table 1 and discussed in Section 3) illustrate a strong preference for reporting internally versus externally. Given 
this preference, we designed our experiment such that participants chose to report internally first and then 
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fail to respond to their earnings quality concerns (Dyck et al. 2010). The dynamics of the 
personal costs to the manager change, however, when reporting to external parties (e.g., external 
auditor) versus internally to the CEO.  
When reporting concerns internally to the CEO, the financial reporting incentives of the 
manager are typically aligned with the CEO. As a result, reporting concerns to the CEO is more 
likely to be an open dialogue about whether or not adjustments need to be made to correct for 
any misrepresentation. Conversely, if the manager’s concerns regarding earnings quality are 
valid, external parties are more independent of the company’s financial performance and tend to 
care much less about the company meeting financial targets. If the financial statements are 
misstated, reporting to an external party like the auditor is more likely to lead to adjustments that 
correct the earnings management (Nelson et al. 2003). In other words, an adjustment to the 
financial statements is likely (i.e., usually a downward adjustment to earnings (Kinney and 
Martin 1994)). Thus, if a manager reports earnings quality concerns to an external party, there 
are additional personal costs to consider. For example, the social costs and retaliation faced by 
employees that blow the whistle externally are significant and well documented (e.g., Carson et 
al. 2008; Jos et al. 1989). Dyck et al. (2010) anecdotally describe the personal effects for 
managers who blow the whistle on fraud with consequences including termination, poor job 
prospects, imprisonment, litigation, and threats/intimidation.  
Still, not reporting concerns externally when red flags are present could also yield 
negative outcomes or personal costs to managers. If red flags are present in financial statements 
and managers do not raise concerns, earnings quality issues may be subsequently discovered. In 
such settings, managers could suffer substantial repercussions both professionally and 
                                                 
considered reporting externally only after “inside the company nothing was done in response to your concern.” We 
believe this design choice reflects the decision-making process managers would employ in practice.  
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personally. For example, the managers who expressed accounting concerns internally in high 
profile frauds like Enron faced federal indictments because they did not subsequently report 
externally when their concerns were not placated (Scannel and Latour 2004). In analyzing 216 
major cases of alleged fraud, Dyck et al. (2010) note that avoiding legal liabilities arising from 
being associated with a fraud was a substantial factor in employees deciding to express concerns 
externally. In addition, anecdotal evidence from high-profile fraud cases suggests that it is not 
uncommon for the CEO to direct financial statement frauds (e.g., Satyam, Parmalat (Soltani 
2014; Melis 2005)), and these frauds are likely to be perpetrated by accounting department staff 
(e.g., ACFE 2014; Feng et al. 2011). Indeed, Feng et al. (2011) find that CEOs with higher 
compensation incentives and power drive accounting manipulations and CEOs are often 
described in SEC enforcement releases as the orchestrator of such manipulations. As such, it is 
possible for the CFO (or other corporate financial managers) to be caught between the director(s) 
and perpetrator(s) of a financial statement fraud. An inadequate internal response may indicate 
CEO involvement and should increase the sense of personal responsibility in the manager. 
Consequently, when red flags are present, we expect that managers will report concerns over 
earnings quality externally if the CEO is made aware of the situation and does not act.8  
Hypothesis 3a, stated formally, is as follows: 
H3a: If concerns over earnings quality are not adequately resolved inside the company, 
managers are more likely to report their concerns externally when red flags are present 
(versus not present). 
 
The degree of pressure faced by managers or the margin of error in meeting a financial 
target may also impact the likelihood that managers report their concerns over earnings quality 
                                                 
8 See http://ww2.cfo.com/fraud/2014/03/whistleblowers-trilemma for further discussion of the dilemma CFOs face 
when deciding to report earnings quality concerns externally and http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/3690780 
for an example of a CFO reporting accounting concerns externally. 
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externally. In terms of reporting earnings quality concerns internally, as mentioned above, the 
manager and CEO’s financial reporting incentives are aligned (i.e., both are motivated to meet 
financial targets). This, combined with evidence that executives are often willing to “get 
creative” and use the discretionary piece of earnings to meet financial reporting targets (e.g., 
Dichev et al. 2013), suggests that sharing concerns with the CEO in high pressure situations may 
allow the manager to not only resolve the earnings quality issue, but to do so without missing 
any targets. Indeed, “the market believes that most firms can “find the money” to hit earnings 
targets” (Graham et al. 2005). 
When reporting externally (e.g., to the external auditor), however, the manager is 
increasing the likelihood that any earnings management is not only detected but also adjusted 
(Nelson et al. 2003). Accordingly, there may be more significant personal costs involved in 
reporting externally, especially if the company is facing a high level of financial reporting 
pressure. In a high-pressure setting, adjustments to the financial statements that stem from 
reporting externally may cause the company to not meet a financial target. For example, an 
adjustment to the financial statements could lead to a violation of a debt covenant that causes 
the bank to call a loan and the external auditor to issue a going concern opinion (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). A negative earnings surprise can lead to costly turmoil in equity markets as 
well (Graham et al. 2005). As such, multiple stakeholders would be affected, likely resulting 
in a severe backlash against the manager. Dyck et al. (2010) report that in 82 percent of cases 
where an employee blew the whistle on a fraud, the employee claims they were fired, 
subsequently quit due to duress, or had their job responsibilities significantly altered.   
Thus, in higher-pressure situations, managers face countervailing personal costs. If a 
manager reports their concerns externally, they are likely to cause a negative adjustment to 
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earnings, negatively affecting their career in the short-term. On the other hand, if they do not 
report externally and an issue becomes known later, they may face long-term personal costs 
and legal liabilities. Again, misstatements identified later that coincide with just meeting a 
financial target are likely to be viewed as intentional by financial statement users and 
regulators. Consequently, given the countervailing personal costs of reporting externally when 
pressure is higher, it is unclear whether pressure to meet a financial target will affect the 
positive relation between the presence of the red flags and the decision to report concerns 
externally.9 Thus, we state Hypothesis 3b in the null form:  
H3b: The positive effect of red flags on managers reporting earnings quality concerns 
externally is not affected by the pressure to meet a financial target. 
 
3. Method 
3.1 Participants  
 
Two hundred and four corporate managers completed an online experimental instrument 
for this study. To obtain our sample of participants, we first contacted 1,052 privately held and 
publicly traded Italian companies obtained from Aida - Bureau Van Dijk 
(https://aida.bvdinfo.com, a database of public and private Italian companies), as well as from 
corporate contacts developed by one of this study’s investigators. We contacted a management 
representative for each company directly, and 951 companies agreed to participate in the study. 
For companies that agreed to participate, we obtained names and email addresses for corporate 
managers in the accounting and corporate finance areas. We targeted chief financial officers 
(CFOs) first and, if no response was obtained, we contacted controllers and other related 
                                                 
9 In our experimental study, we measured such countervailing personal costs and perform additional analyses related 
to these costs in Section 4. 
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corporate managers.10 Managers were contacted via email and provided with a link to the online 
research instrument (described below), which was administered via Qualtrics (there were three 
follow-up emails to encourage participation). Two hundred and twenty managers began the 
instrument, 14 of those managers did not complete the instrument, and we removed two 
observations completed by the same participant, leaving a sample of 204 managers.11 Our 
response rate of 19.4% (204/1,052) is greater than the response rates of prior studies that have 
engaged corporate managers in the areas of accounting and corporate finance (e.g., Dichev et al. 
2013; Evans et al. 2015; Graham et al. 2005; Brazel et al. 2016a).12   
Table 1 provides demographic data for our participants and their companies. We have an 
experienced set of participants, with 38.73% and 27.45% being CFOs and controllers, 
respectively. Participants have, on average, 10-19 years of experience at their job, are between 
40-49 years of age, and hold an undergraduate degree.13 Given their management positions, and 
consistent with our discussion above, 100% of our participants are involved with the production 
of financial statements and 83.82% are in some manner responsible for their companies’ 
financial statements. Our participants are also apt to search for red flags when they review the 
financial statements of their company (see variable 5 with an average response of 5.28 out of 7).  
                                                 
10 After the Parmalat scandal, the Italian Government edited Law no. 262 (Italian Law No. 262 2005), which now 
requires disclosures of the CFO for all Italian companies (prior to the law change this information was only disclosed 
for publicly listed companies). This change aimed to increase the transparency of corporate financial disclosure and 
create a more effective system of internal controls. The CFO became jointly responsible (with the CEO) for financial 
reporting. 
11 Qualtrics allows researchers to conduct several follow-up procedures targeting all participants. Due to the nature 
of the follow-up procedures, it is possible for a participant to start the research instrument and not complete it. Then, 
when a link to the instrument is provided in a follow-up email, that same participant could start the instrument again 
(versus restarting the incomplete instrument) and complete it.     
12 Similar to Dichev et al. (2013), to guard against someone other than the manager completing the instrument (e.g., 
an administrative assistant), we asked for extensive personal information and specific data about the manager’s 
company in the post-experimental questionnaire (see Table 1). 
13 According to a 2010 EY survey of 669 CFOs from Europe, the Middle East, India, and Africa, only 27% had 
obtained the MBA degree 
(http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Estudio_DNA_CFOs_2010/$FILE/DNA_CFOs_2.pdf). 
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Participants reported being highly likely to report red flags internally to a superior, with 
an average response of 6.33 out of 7 and a relatively low standard deviation of 1.04. This is 
indicative of substantial consensus amongst managers to report earnings quality concerns 
internally. On the other hand, these managers are less likely to report concerns to a 
whistleblower hotline or someone external to the company, with average responses (standard 
deviations) of 3.91 (2.36) and 4.22 (2.27), respectively. These responses are consistent with 
Taylor and Curtis (2010) and Brink et al. (2013), who find that employees are more likely to 
report concerns over earnings quality internally, rather than externally. Note also that the 
standard deviations for reporting via a hotline or externally are more than twice the magnitude of 
reporting internally, indicating less consensus amongst managers regarding these two reporting 
options. This lack of consensus may reflect the countervailing personal costs of reporting 
externally, as noted previously. We measure, in the context of our experiment, the likelihood our 
participants would use multiple internal and external reporting outlets (see footnotes 22 and 23). 
Participants’ companies have, on average, between $100-$499 million in total sales and 
between 25%-50% of total sales are foreign sales. Consistent with the Italian economy being 
dominated by privately held companies, 81.86% of our participants work for privately held 
companies.14 The mean company age is 41.83 years, and the most common industries are 
                                                 
14 Burgstahler et al. (2006) document that, within the European Union, private companies are much more prevalent 
than public companies and private companies exhibit higher levels of earnings management. In Italy, approximately 
360 companies are publicly listed (http://www.borsaitaliana.it/homepage/homepage.htm) and 7,500 companies are 
owned by the State (http://www.panorama.it/economia/aziende/aizende-pubbliche-quanto-costano-stato/), while 5.3 
million companies are privately owned (http://www.digital4.biz/pmi/approfondimenti/quasi-53-milioni-le-imprese-
in-italia_4367215623.htm). We acknowledge that private company managers do not face the pressures associated 
with widely dispersed investors, which may affect their willingness to report red flags (e.g., the market reaction to 
restatements is not as forefront in their minds as it would be for managers of publicly traded companies). On the 
other hand, the required public disclosure of both public and private company CFOs in Italy (see footnote 10) likely 
has elevated accountability levels amongst CFOs similar to the certification of quarterly and annual reports in the 
U.S. under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. To investigate differences between private and public company 
participants, we compare the responses provided by private and public company managers in our most extreme 
condition (PRESSURE high and RED FLAGS present or Condition 4 as described in Figure 1 and Table 2). Mean 
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manufacturing, service/consulting, and retail/wholesale. Finally, 65.33% of the participants’ 
companies were audited by an international accounting firm (versus an Italian accounting firm).  
Given that our study extends the work of Dichev et al. (2013), we compare our 
demographic data in Table 1 to that obtained from the survey participants in Dichev et al. (2013)   
who worked for private U.S. companies (see Table 1 in Dichev et al. (2013), where 54.93% of 
participants worked for a private company). Like our sample, the private company CFOs in 
Dichev et al. (2013) are most likely managing a manufacturing company with between $100-
$499 million in sales. As one would expect, given that Italy is a smaller marker than the U.S., 
our participants report a higher proportion of foreign sales. Our participants are also slightly 
younger, but have greater experience in their position. Last, the percentage of our participants 
with a public accounting background (41.32%) is very similar to the 41.26% observed by Dichev 
et al. (2013).15 
3.2 Description of the experimental context 
The experimental materials placed participants in the position of CFO of a hypothetical 
company named Tecno Sporting Goods, a manufacturer of sporting goods equipment consisting 
of four divisions.16 Their task was to perform a preliminary, top-level review of Tecno Sporting 
                                                 
responses for CONCERN, INTERNALLY, and EXTERNALLY are not significantly different (p’s > .05) between 
private and public company managers.  
15 With respect to total company sales and age, our participants are also similar to the corporate managers in Evans 
et al. (2015). 
16 Instruments were provided online and in Italian, the native language of the participants. The instruments were first 
developed in English. To develop the Italian versions of the instruments, we followed the translation-back 
procedures outlined by Brislin (1986). Specifically, in the first stage, the experimental instruments were translated 
from English to Italian by one of the authors who is fluent in both languages. Then, another independent academic 
translated the Italian version back to English (back-translated English version). The original and back-translated 
English versions were then compared, and all discrepancies resolved by the translators. In a second stage, to assure 
that the materials would be realistic and understood by respondents, the instrument was carefully pre-tested. First, 
the instruments were discussed with Italian academic scholars to assess the clarity of the instruments. Afterwards, a 
pilot study was also conducted with a group of accounting managers from three Italian companies (with their input 
being incorporated into the instruments). Finally, the final instruments were reviewed once more by a panel of three 
Italian academic scholars. 
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Goods’ consolidated, year-end financial condition. Participants learned that Tecno’s main 
financing came in the form of loans from First National Bank, and that the bank required audited 
financial statements annually. Tecno’s debt covenant with First National Bank required that they 
meet several financial ratios. Participants were informed that if there was a debt covenant 
violation, the bank had the right to require that all future payments under the loans be due 
immediately. The materials also provided participants with additional information about Tecno 
and its industry, including product and customer information, industry sales, and highlights from 
a recent business news article.  
Participants were also told the following: 
Tecno Sporting Goods consists of four divisions that are consolidated for financial 
reporting purposes. Each division has a controller in charge of preparing the division’s 
financial statements. The corporate controller (who works directly under you) is in charge 
of consolidating the divisions’ financial statements into one set of financial statements for 
Tecno Sporting Goods. Your corporate controller is primarily responsible for preparing 
Tecno Sporting Goods’ consolidated financial statements.  
 
Participants were informed that, in order to perform their top-level review of Tecno’s 
financial condition, they asked their corporate controller for: 1) preliminary 2013 Tecno 
consolidated financial statements (along with comparative financial statements from the two 
prior years), 2) financial ratio calculations, and 3) important non-financial data for Tecno (e.g., 
employee headcounts, number of patents).  
3.3 Independent variables 
The experiment manipulated two variables between subjects, each at two levels, resulting 
in four experimental conditions. Figure 1 illustrates the four experimental conditions. The first 
manipulated variable was the presence of red flags, manipulated as red flags either being present 
or not present in the current year financial statements under review (this variable is referred to as 
“RED FLAGS” below).  
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Dichev et al. (2013) describe the challenge of isolating red flags that effectively signal 
earnings management. However, their surveys and interviews of CFOs suggest that companies 
managing earnings typically exhibit multiple red flags (e.g., Table 14 of Dichev et al. (2013) lists 
20 red flags, each identified by multiple CFOs). Many of these red flags (e.g., high accruals) are 
also associated with incidences of fraudulent financial reporting (e.g., Dechow et al. 2011; 
Gullkvist and Jokipii 2013). Consistent with the findings reported in Dichev et al. (2013), 
research has concluded that in the case of extreme earnings management or fraud, firms typically 
exhibit multiple red flags prior to detection (e.g., Hogan et al. 2008; see also footnote 5). Because 
we are interested in determining how the presence of red flags induces manager concerns over 
earnings quality and reporting behavior, we manipulate multiple (two) red flags at levels of both 
fraud and non-fraud companies (for our RED FLAGS present and not present conditions, 
respectively).  
The CFOs in Dichev et al. (2013) most frequently cited earnings that are inconsistent 
with cash flows (i.e., high accruals) as a red flag for earnings management. DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) observe that companies manage earnings through accruals to meet debt 
covenants. Likewise, both Lee et al. (1999) and Dechow et al. (2011) illustrate that fraud firms 
have significantly higher levels of accruals as compared to non-fraud firms. Thus, for our RED 
FLAGS present condition, the first red flag we manipulate is the accrual red flag. The accrual red 
flag is manipulated as present or not present, based upon the findings of Lee et al. (1999) and 
Brazel et al. (2009). For the RED FLAGS present (not present) condition, accruals represented 
11% (1%) of total assets.17 We manipulated the level of positive accruals, as net income 
                                                 
17 Because the measurements of the accrual red flag for fraud (15% of total assets) and non-fraud firms (1%) 
provided by Lee et al. (1999) may be dated, we averaged their findings with the accrual red flag measure of Brazel 
et al. (2009). Brazel et al. (2009) observe the accrual red flag for fraud (non-fraud) firms to be 7% (0%) of total 
assets. 
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exceeded cash flow from operations in both conditions. Financial statement data on the income 
statement and balance sheet were kept constant in all conditions, while current year cash flow 
from operations was altered to achieve high and low accrual levels. 
Companies managing earnings are often referred to as companies that misrepresent their 
economic performance or the results of operations (e.g., Dichev et al. 2013). Companies disclose 
non-financial measures (“NFMs,” such as number of patents, production space, and employee 
headcount) that reflect key aspects of performance/operations and represent measures of 
economic activity (Francis et al. 2003; Schultz et al. 2010). Both Brazel et al. (2009) and 
Dechow et al. (2011) document that fraud firms exhibit substantial differences between growth 
in their reported financial measures (e.g., revenue growth) and growth in related NFMs (e.g., 
growth in employees and stores). Thus, the second red flag we manipulate is the NFM red flag. 
In all conditions, the current year’s sales growth was 6%. In the RED FLAGS present condition, 
participants observed current year NFM growth of, on average, -19% (25 percentage points 
different from sales growth). For the RED FLAGS not present condition, participants observed 
current year NFM growth of, on average, 0% (6 percentage points different from sales growth). 
While the rate of NFM growth was manipulated between participants, the types of NFMs 
provided to participants were kept constant (e.g., number of employees, product lines, patents).18 
In sum, in the RED FLAGS present condition, both the accrual and NFM red flags were 
present. In the RED FLAGS not present condition, neither the accrual nor the NFM red flag were 
present. For all participants, prior year accruals were low and prior year sales and NFM growth 
were consistent (i.e., both accrual and NFM red flags were not present in the prior year). As 
                                                 
18 We relied on the descriptive data of Brazel et al. (2009) to manipulate the sales/NFM relation in a realistic 
manner. The NFM red flag observed by Brazel et al. (2009) compares sales growth to the average growth of related 
NFMs (all NFMs are equally weighted). Our manipulation reflects this treatment. 
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described above, given the breadth of knowledge necessary to complete the tasks of a CFO 
effectively, these managers commonly have expertise in finance, accounting, and/or a strong 
working knowledge of operations. The two red flags selected for this study (accrual and NFM) 
are reflective of this knowledge-base. Consistent with our predictions and extending Dichev et 
al. (2013), manipulation checks indicate that when red flags are present, managers can identify 
red flags when reviewing the financial reporting package.19 
The second manipulated variable was the pressure to meet a financial target (this variable 
is referred to as “PRESSURE” below). Related to PRESSURE, Dichev et al. (2013) asked CFOs 
if companies report earnings to misrepresent economic performance to avoid violation of debt 
covenants. Eighty-nine percent (73%) of private (public) CFOs agreed that they did.  
In the lower PRESSURE conditions of our study, participants were told the following: 
You have been informed by your corporate controller that Tecno’s 2013 ratio for percent 
return on assets from the preliminary 2013 consolidated financial statements easily exceeds 
the required ratio as stated in the First National Bank debt covenant.   
 
In the higher PRESSURE conditions, participants were told the following: 
 
You have been informed by your corporate controller that Tecno’s 2013 ratio for percent 
return on assets from the preliminary 2013 consolidated financial statements just barely 
meets the required ratio as stated in the First National Bank debt covenant. 
 
Given the expectation that most of our participants would be CFOs or controllers of privately 
held companies, we selected a financial target that would be relevant to both private and public 
companies (versus equity-based pressures). Indeed, both Bonacchi et al. (2017) and Bianchi 
                                                 
19 Participants were post-experimentally asked to recall 1) the difference between the company’s net income and 
cash flow from operations, and 2) the difference between the company’s sales growth and growth in NFMs 
(measured via scales, where 1 = “Very small” and 7 = “Very large”). Non-tabulated results indicate that those in 
RED FLAGS present condition rated both of these differences to be significantly larger than those in the RED 
FLAGS not present condition (both p’s < 0.01). 
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(2017) note that, in Italy, relationships with banks are crucial and companies manage earnings to 
obtain/maintain debt financing.20  
3.4 Dependent variables 
Our first dependent variable of interest is the level of the manager’s concern over 
earnings quality (this variable is referred to as “CONCERN” below). After reviewing the 
experimental materials, participants responded to the following prompt:   
Based on your preliminary review, net income for Tecno in 2013 is: 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Materially understated” and the right endpoint labeled “Materially overstated.” The 
middle of the scale, which was 4, was labeled “Very accurate.” We measure CONCERN as the 
absolute value of the participant’s response from the midpoint of 4 (that earnings are very 
accurate). For example, if a participant responded 4, their CONCERN was 0. If a participant 
responded 3 or 5, their CONCERN was 1, and so on. Thus, our variable CONCERN ranges from 
0 to 3, with higher values indicating greater concerns over earnings being either materially over 
or understated.21  
                                                 
20 Related to our PRESSURE manipulation, participants were asked to recall if Tecno’s percent return on assets 
barely met or was well above the ratio required by First National Bank (measured via scale, where 1 = “Just met” 
and 7 = “Well above”). Non-tabulated results indicate that the mean response for those in the higher PRESSURE 
condition was significantly lower than those in the lower PRESSURE condition (p < .01).  
21 Our manipulations of PRESSURE and RED FLAGS would be more likely associated with net income being 
overstated than understated (e.g., pressure related to the return on assets, net income substantially higher than cash 
flow from operations). Indeed, only three participants in the PRESSURE high/RED FLAGS present condition 
(Condition 4 in Table 2) indicated concerns that earnings were understated (our tests of hypotheses are robust to 
excluding these three participants from our analyses). However, to avoid demand effects, we provided our 
participants with the option to respond that net income was understated, very accurate, or overstated. We find 
qualitatively similar results for our test of H1a and H1b if we replace CONCERN with the 7-point response scale 
ranging from 1 to 7 (not the absolute value), with the left endpoint labeled “Materially understated” and the right 
endpoint labeled “Materially overstated.” We observe qualitatively similar results for our test of H1a using scales 
measuring participants’ perceptions of the accuracy of the financial statements, the level at which Tecno’s earnings 
were managed, or the likelihood Tecno’s financial statements were fraudulent. The latter two scales were completed 
by participants at the end of the study to avoid demand effects.  
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 Our other dependent variables of interest are the likelihood that the manager will report 
concerns over earnings quality internally (referred to as “INTERNALLY” below) and the 
likelihood that the manager will report concerns over earnings quality externally (referred to as 
“EXTERNALLY” below). We measured INTERNALLY with the following question:   
You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. To what 
extent would you discuss this concern with your Chief Executive Officer (CEO)? 
 
Whether the question indicated “overstated” or “understated” was determined by the 
participant’s response to the aforementioned CONCERN prompt. Participants responded on a 7-
point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint labeled “Would not discuss” and 
the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” We measured INTERNALLY by examining 
reporting intentions to the CEO because 1) the CEO is the superior to the CFO role the 
participants assumed in the study, and 2) those reporting concerns over fraud are most likely to 
convey their concerns to their direct supervisor (ACFE 2016).22 
We measured EXTERNALLY with the following question:   
You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. If inside 
your company nothing was done in response to your concern, to what extent would you 
discuss this concern with your external auditor? 
 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Would not discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” We measured 
EXTERNALLY by examining reporting intentions to the auditor because, for the CFO, the 
auditor is likely the closest independent external party to the financial statements. In addition, 
                                                 
22 We obtain qualitatively similar results to the ones reported herein if we measure INTERNALLY with discussing 
their concern with the corporate controller. Discussing concerns with the corporate controller, who the instrument 
explicitly states is responsible for preparing the company’s consolidated financial statements, would likely be a 
more direct method of correcting any financial reporting issues. This of course assumes that the controller is aware 
of any issues and/or is willing to admit to any wrongdoing, which may not be the case. We find that, when red flags 
are present, the mean participant response for discussing their concern with their controller (mean = 4.82) is 
approximately the same as the mean response for discussing their concern with their CEO (mean = 4.87). Thus, 
participants did not express a preference for one form of internal reporting over the other. 
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both the CEO and the auditor are “part of a chain of actors” responsible for the reliability of the 
financial statements (IFAC 2013).23 If a participant responded to CONCERN with a “4,” they 
were not asked questions about INTERNALLY and EXTERNALLY because such questions 
would be nonsensical given that they indicated that net income was “Very accurate” (i.e., there 
are no concerns to discuss). Participants responding “4” to CONCERN were, therefore, coded as 
“1” (“Would not discuss”) for the INTERNALLY and EXTERNALLY variables described 
above.24 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Participants’ mean responses (standard deviations) for CONCERN, INTERNALLY, and 
EXTERNALLY by experimental condition are presented in Table 2 and graphed in Figures 2, 3, 
and 4. Consistent with H1a, managers in the RED FLAGS present conditions have higher 
CONCERN levels (versus the RED FLAGS not present conditions). Consistent with H1b, the 
aforementioned effect of RED FLAGS on CONCERN appears to be stronger when PRESSURE 
is higher versus lower. Related to H2a, H2b, H3a and H3b, the levels of INTERNALLY and 
EXTERNALLY are higher when RED FLAGS are present, but it appears that the effects of RED 
FLAGS are not moderated by the level of PRESSURE. One last item to note is that, regardless of 
PRESSURE and RED FLAGS, the likelihood of reporting INTERNALLY and EXTERNALLY 
                                                 
23 With respect to responding externally after reporting concerns internally, IFAC (2016) notes the importance of 
alerting the auditor under such circumstances, such that the auditor is provided with all the information that is 
necessary for them to complete their audit. The ACFE (2016) document that those reporting fraud externally use 
multiple outlets (including their auditor) to convey their concerns. We obtain qualitatively similar results to the ones 
reported herein if we measure EXTERNALLY with reporting to First National Bank. Alternatively, reporting 
concerns over earnings quality to an audit committee or an anonymous whistleblower hotline may be a less extreme 
step than reporting to the external auditor. We find qualitatively similar results when we asked participants to what 
extent they would report their concerns over earnings quality to such outlets. 
24 Fifty three participants (25% of our sample) responded to CONCERN with a “4.” As one would expect, the 
percentage responding to CONCERN with a “4” was higher in the RED FLAGS not present condition (35%) than in 
the RED FLAGS present condition (18%). 
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is typically low to moderate regardless of condition, with the exception of the extreme condition 
where PRESSURE is high and RED FLAGS are present. In this condition (Condition 4), 
participants are more inclined to report concerns over earnings quality INTERNALLY (mean = 
5.46, whereas the means for all other responses range from 2.65 to 4.40 on 7-point scales). Even 
in our experimental setting, managers are somewhat reluctant to report earnings quality concerns, 
but are apt to report internally when they encounter an extreme condition. 
4.2 Testing of hypotheses 
We formally test H1a and H1b using an ANOVA presented in Table 3. As predicted 
by H1a, there is a strong effect for RED FLAGS on CONCERN (F-statistic = 61.48, p < .001). 
As depicted in Table 2 and Figure 2, and in line with our manipulation check (see footnote 
19), when RED FLAGS are present, our participants identify those red flags and in turn, have 
greater concerns over earnings quality. Consistent with PRESSURE being a root cause of both 
managed earnings (Dichev et al. 2013) and fraud (e.g., the fraud triangle (Cressey 1953)), we 
also observe a significant effect for PRESSURE on CONCERN (F-statistic = 8.29, p = .004). 
Table 2 depicts higher means under higher PRESSURE (versus lower). Related to H1b, we 
find a significant interaction between RED FLAGS and PRESSURE (F-statistic = 4.66, p = 
.032). H1b predicts that the positive effect of red flags on managers’ concerns over earnings 
quality is stronger when the pressure to meet a financial target is higher (versus lower). In 
other words, H1b predicts that the difference between Conditions 4 and 2 for CONCERN (see 
Table 2) should be larger than the difference between Conditions 3 and 1. Visual inspection of 
the means in Figure 2 suggests the form of the interaction is consistent with H1b. However, to 
formally test whether the form of the interaction is consistent with our hypothesis, we 
performed a planned contrast. Non-tabulated results confirm that the observed interaction is 
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consistent with the form of the interaction posited by H1b (value of the contrast = .54, t-
statistic = 2.172, p = .015).  
We formally test H2a, H2b, H3a, and H3b using a MANOVA presented in Table 4. 
Consistent with H2a, there is a strong effect for RED FLAGS on INTERNALLY (F-statistic = 
46.36, p < .001). The means provided in Table 2 and depicted in Figure 3 suggest that, when 
RED FLAGS are present, managers are more inclined to report their concerns over earnings 
quality INTERNALLY to their CEO. In Table 4 we also observe a significant effect for 
PRESSURE on INTERNALLY (F-statistic = 12.87, p < .001). Thus, in the presence of RED 
FLAGS or higher PRESSURE, participants are more apt to report concerns over earnings 
quality INTERNALLY.25 However, unlike our results for CONCERN and contrary to H2b, 
visual inspection of the means in Figure 3 does not depict an interaction between RED 
FLAGS and PRESSURE. In Table 4 we do not observe a significant interactive effect 
between RED FLAGS and PRESSURE (F-statistic = 1.16, p = .283). Thus, PRESSURE does 
not positively moderate the effect of RED FLAGS on INTERNALLY, but rather increases the 
likelihood of reporting internally regardless of whether or not red flags are present. This result 
may reflect our finding in Table 1 of a relatively low standard deviation for “Report internally 
to a superior” (variable 6 in Table 1), which is indicative of substantial consensus amongst 
managers to report red flag concerns internally (regardless of pressure). It also may suggest 
that if targets have been barely met (i.e., pressure is higher), managers will have internal 
discussions. 
                                                 
25 Consistent with our development of hypotheses and our observed main effects for PRESSURE, we find 
significant positive relations (p’s < .05) between PRESSURE and the motivation/mental efforts participants reported 
vis-à-vis their review of the financial statements. Likewise, we find significant positive relations (p’s < .05) between 
PRESSURE and participants’ perceptions that Tecno’s earnings were managed/fraudulent. 
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Supporting H3a, we observe a significant main effect for RED FLAGS on 
EXTERNALLY (F-statistic = 23.80, p < .001). Inspection of the means for EXTERNALLY in 
Table 2 and Figure 4 reveal that, when RED FLAGS are present and concerns are not resolved 
internally, participants are more apt to report EXTERNALLY to their external auditor. Unlike 
the decision to report INTERNALLY, however, PRESSURE does not appear to have a direct 
effect on EXTERNALLY (F-statistic = .003, p = .957).  
H3b is stated in the null form: The positive effect of red flags on managers reporting 
concerns externally is not affected by the pressure to meet a financial target. Consistent with this 
null hypothesis (and depicted in Figure 4), we do not observe a significant interaction between 
RED FLAGS and PRESSURE in Table 4. As indicated by the means for EXTERNALLY 
presented in Table 2, when RED FLAGS are present, participants were moderately willing to 
report EXTERNALLY, regardless of pressure. Last, Non-tabulated tests of mediation using the 
Hayes (2013) bootstrapping procedure also illustrate that CONCERN mediates the relations 
between (1) RED FLAGS and INTERNALLY (Lower CI = 1.052, Upper CI = 1.819) and (2) 
RED FLAGS and EXTERNALLY (Lower CI = .646, Upper CI = 1.398).  
Overall, we provide strong strong evidence that managers can identify and react to the 
presence of RED FLAGS and mixed evidence related to the role of PRESSURE. Next, we 
specifically examine the countervailing short- and long-term costs associated with reporting 
earnings quality concerns. 
4.3 Countervailing costs of reporting concerns over earnings quality  
While bearing concerns over earnings quality may cause personal stress for the 
corporate manager, the act of reporting EXTERNALLY comes with significant short-term 
costs for the manager. When reporting externally (e.g., to the external auditor or bank), the 
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manager is increasing the likelihood that any earnings management and/or fraud in the 
financial statements is not only detected, but also adjusted (i.e., restated). As noted previously, 
the short-term social costs/retaliations faced by employees that blow the whistle externally are 
significant and well documented (e.g., Carson et al. 2008; Jos et al. 1989). To measure this 
short-term cost, we asked participants in our study: 
As the CFO of Tecno, please describe how your career at Tecno would be affected if 
you adjusted Tecno’s 2013 net income downward to correct any accounting 
misstatements (referred to as “ADJUSTMENT”): 
 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Very negatively” and the right endpoint labeled “Very positively.”  
In non-tabulated tests of mediation using the Hayes (2013) bootstrapping procedure, 
we find that ADJUSTMENT significantly mediates the relation between RED FLAGS and 
EXTERNALLY (t = 1.986, p = .048, LLCI = .001, ULCI = .319). When pressure is high and 
red flags are present, managers perceive a substantial short-term cost to their career if they are 
somehow deemed responsible for an adjustment to earnings. As such, they are significantly 
less likely to report their earnings quality concerns to their external auditor (LLCI = -.308, 
ULCI = -.014). Thus, when PRESSURE is high and RED FLAGS are present, we observe that 
managers maintain the highest level of CONCERN (see Condition 4 in Table 2), but also have 
an incentive to not report EXTERNALLY (i.e., short-term career cost).26  
However, short-term career costs associated with a potential adjustment to earnings 
may not be the only personal cost considered by managers when deciding to report 
                                                 
26 Conversely, when PRESSURE is low, ADJUSTMENT significantly mediates the relation between RED FLAGS 
and EXTERNALLY, but in the opposite direction (LLCI = .031, ULCI = .483). When pressure is low and red flags 
are present, managers are less likely to perceive a substantial short-term cost to their career if they are somehow 
deemed responsible for an adjustment to earnings. As such, they are more willing to report their earnings quality 
concerns to their external auditor. 
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EXTERNALLY. We also examine the long-term costs of not reporting concerns 
EXTERNALLY. Feng et al. (2011) and Beasley et al. (2010) describe how CFOs of 
companies that manipulated earnings face future employment restrictions, legal issues, and 
other long-term costs. In line with these long-term costs, we asked participants in our study 
two questions: 
As the CFO of Tecno, please describe the risk to your career if you submit the 2013 
Tecno financial statements to First National Bank (assuming no adjustments are made 
to the financial statements) (referred to as “CAREER RISK”): 
 
As the CFO of Tecno, please describe your risk of litigation if you submit the 2013 
Tecno financial statements to First National Bank (assuming no adjustments are made 
to the financial statements) (referred to as “LITIGATION RISK”): 
 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “None” and the right endpoint labeled “Very high.”  
Although the presence of RED FLAGS positively affects CAREER RISK and 
LITIGATION RISK, neither CAREER RISK (t = 1.75, p = .082, LLCI = -.026, ULCI = .420) 
nor LITIGATION RISK (t = .481, p = .631, LLCI = -.169, ULCI = .278) are significant 
mediators of the relation between RED FLAGS and EXTERNALLY. In other words, these 
concerns over long-term costs did not ultimately affect the reporting behavior of our 
participants.27  
4.4 Job tenure and reporting earnings quality concerns 
In relation to the sham-account sales scandal at Wells Fargo (that led to the ouster of the 
CEO, substantial fines, etc.), Wells Fargo executives reported to the press that the “root of Wells 
Fargo’s crisis-control debacle is an insular corporate culture, fostered by executives with decades 
of tenure” (Glazer 2016). Likewise, in his study of white collar criminals, Soltes (2016) notes 
                                                 
27 We find these non-significant results regardless of the level of PRESSURE. 
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that “when individuals become more senior in an organization, they tend to be more susceptible 
to overconfidence and trust their own ability to successfully navigate challenges.” Schrand and 
Zechman (2012) observe that overconfident executives are more inclined to start down the 
slippery slope of intentionally misstating their financial statements.  
Given the prior discussion of short- and long-term career concerns, we examine 
correlations between our participants’ experience/tenure at their position (variable 9 in Table 1) 
and INTERNALLY and EXTERNALLY. With respect to reporting when RED FLAGS are 
present, both correlations were negative, with INTERNALLY approaching significance (p = 
.126) and EXTERNALLY marginally significant (p = .072). Thus, we provide initial evidence 
that corporate managers with longer tenure at their positions are less likely to “rock the boat” and 
report concerns over earnings quality externally. It is possible that longer-tenured employees are 
more concerned about short-term costs because they are further in their careers, meaning long-
term effects may be less relevant (e.g., they are more likely to retire sooner holding their same 
position and are less likely to obtain a future management position at another company).  
4.5 The professional accountant’s role in reporting concerns 
As described in Table 1 (variable 12), 41.32% of our sample participants indicated that 
their background was in public accounting (versus finance, credit, investment banking). IFAC 
(2016) notes: “A distinguishing mark of the accountancy professional is its acceptance of the 
responsibility to act in the public interest.” In addition, if a misstatement is later identified, the 
CFO with an accounting background is more likely to be held responsible for the error or fraud 
(versus a CFO with finance experience who may be able to deflect responsibility to a corporate 
controller). Provided this added incentive for managers with public accounting backgrounds to 
report earnings quality concerns, we examine correlations between a public accounting 
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background (variable 12 in Table 1) and the likelihood of reporting concerns INTERNALLY and 
EXTERNALLY. When RED FLAGS are present, both correlations were positive, with 
INTERNALLY approaching significance (p = .119) and EXTERNALLY significant (p = .012). 
Consistent with the recent ethical framework set forth by IFAC (2016), we observe that, when 
fraud red flags are present, managers with public accounting backgrounds are more likely to 
report externally. 
4.6 Examination of only CFO participants 
 Seventy-nine (38.73%) of our participants hold the management role of CFO at their 
respective companies (versus controller, financial accounting manager). While examining the 
responses of only CFOs substantially reduces our sample size, we observe that our inferences 
related to our hypotheses remain the same except for H2b. When examining the responses of 
only CFOs, the positive effect of RED FLAGS on INTERNALLY is stronger when PRESSURE 
is higher (see Table 5 and Figure 5). A comparison of Figures 3 and 5 suggests the difference in 
results are due to CFO participants, when RED FLAGS are present and PRESSURE is low, 
being more hesitant to report INTERNALLY (mean = 3.14, see Figure 5) than our full sample 
that also contains controllers, finance directors, etc. (mean = 4.20, see Figure 3). It is possible 
that CFO participants who observe RED FLAGS under low PRESSURE are less inclined to 
“jump the gun” and discuss their concerns with their CEO. They may be more inclined to 
address their concerns over earnings quality with their subordinates responsible for preparing the 
financial statements. However, we do not observe a strong inclination for our CFO participants 
to talk to either their corporate controller or divisional controllers when RED FLAGS are present 
and PRESSURE is low (means = 3.33 and 3.14, respectively). This lack of response from our 
CFOs participants is concerning as it suggests that CFOs are prone to fall down the “slippery 
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slope” that could result in them having to actively participate in intentional misreporting in future 
periods to unwind any past, opportunistic earnings management that was not nipped at the bud 
(Schrand and Zechman 2012).  
5. Conclusion 
Management is tasked with preventing and detecting extreme earnings management at 
companies, as it is both costly and undermines public confidence in the markets. Consequently, it 
is important for us to not only understand whether managers are able to recognize the red flags 
that indicate earnings management, but also whether they are willing to respond to such risks by 
reporting concerns to the appropriate party(ies). In this study, we observe that managers’ 
concerns over earnings quality increase when red flags are present in the financial statements 
they review. In addition, when the pressure to meet a financial target is greater, managers are 
more concerned about earnings quality when reviewing financial statements exhibiting red flags.  
We also document that when red flags are present, managers are more likely to report 
both internally to their CEO and, if their concerns are not resolved internally, externally to their 
auditor. Although pressure to meet a financial target directly impacts reporting internally, it does 
not moderate the positive relation we observe between the presence of red flags and the 
likelihood of reporting internally and externally. Last, we examine the countervailing costs to 
reporting earnings quality concerns. We find that managers perceive both short-term and long-
term job costs to reporting, but only the short-term costs impact the likelihood that they report 
externally. 
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TABLE 1 
Demographic Data 
    Response 
[n = 204] 
Mean (Std. Dev.) Variables   
 
Participant Variables   
1. % CFO   38.73 
2. % Controller   27.45 
3. % Involved with the production of financial statements  100.00 
4. % Responsible for the financial statements  83.82 
5. Search for red flags   5.28 (1.80) 
6. Report internally to a superior  6.33 (1.04) 
7. Report anonymously to whistleblower hotline  3.91 (2.36) 
8. Report externally  4.22 (2.27) 
9. Experience at position   2.76 (.86) 
10. Age  1.57 (.713) 
11. Education  2.98 (.74) 
12. % Background in public accounting  41.32 
   
Company Variables   
13. Sales   2.58 (1.70) 
14. Foreign sales  2.55 (1.16) 
15. % Privately held  81.86 
16. Company age  41.83 (34.57) 
17. % Manufacturing industry  20.59 
18. % Service/Consulting industry   12.25 
19. % Retail/Wholesale industry  9.80 
20. % Other industry  35.31 
21. % Did not provide industry  22.05 
22. % Audited by an international accounting firm  65.33 
   
 
1. % CFO = Coded 1 if the participant inputted their job title as chief financial officer, 0 otherwise. 
2. % Controller = Coded 1 if the participant inputted their job title as controller, 0 otherwise. 
3. % Involved with the production of financial statements = As part of your current job, are you in 
anyway involved with producing your company’s financial statements? Coded 1 if the participant 
responded yes, 0 otherwise. 
4. % Responsible for the financial statements = As part of your current job, are you in anyway 
responsible for your company’s financial statements? Coded 1 if the participant responded yes, 0 
otherwise. 
5. Search for red flags = When you review the financial statements of your company, to what extent do 
you search for red flags related to fraud? Measured via a scale where 1 = “Never” and 7 = “Always.” 
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6. Report internally to a superior = If you identified a fraud red flag while reviewing your company’s 
financial statements, what would be the likelihood you would discuss the fraud red flag with your boss 
at your company? Measured via a scale where 1 = “Low Likelihood” and 7 = “High Likelihood.” 
7. Report anonymously to whistleblower hotline = If you identified a red flag while reviewing your 
company’s financial statements and your company was not responsive to your concern, what would be 
the likelihood you would report the red flag to your company’s anonymous whistleblower hotline? 
Measured via a scale where 1 = “Low Likelihood” and 7 = “High Likelihood.” 
8. Report externally = If you identified a red flag while reviewing your company’s financial statements 
and your company was not responsive to your concern, what would be the likelihood you would discuss 
the red flag with someone outside your company (e.g., external auditor)? Measured via a scale where 
1 = “Low Likelihood” and 7 = “High Likelihood.” 
9. Experience at position = Your time in job. Measured via a scale where 1 = “< 4 years” and 4 = “≥ 20 
years” 
10. Age = Your age. Measured via a scale where 1 = < 40  and 4 “≥ 60 years” 
11. Education = Your education. Measured via a scale where 1 = “High school” and 5 = “non-MBA 
masters” 
12. % Background in public accounting = Coded 1 if the participant indicated that their background 
was in public accounting, 0 otherwise. 
13. Sales = Sales revenue. Measured via a scale where 1 = “Less than $25 million” and 7 = “More than 
$10 billion” 
14. Foreign sales = Proportion of foreign sales at your company. Measured via a scale where 1 = “0%” 
and 4 = “≥ 50”  
15. % Privately held = Is the company you currently work for privately held or publicly traded? Coded 1 
if the participant responded privately held, 0 otherwise. 
16. Company age = Company age in years inputted by participant. 
17. % Manufacturing industry = Coded 1 if the participant indicated the company was in the 
manufacturing industry, 0 otherwise. 
18. % Service/Consulting industry = Coded 1 if the participant indicated the company was in the 
Service/Consulting industry, 0 otherwise. 
19. % Retail/Wholesale industry = Coded 1 if the participant indicated the company was in the 
Retail/Wholesale industry, 0 otherwise. 
20. % Other industry = Coded 1 if the participant indicated the company was in an industry other than 
Manufacturing, Service/Consulting, or Retail/Wholesale, 0 otherwise. 
21. % Did not provide industry = Coded 1 if the participant did not provide a company industry, 0 
otherwise. 
22. % Audited by an international accounting firm = Is your company’s auditor an international 
accounting firm (e.g., KPMG) or an Italian accounting firm. Coded 1 if participant responded 
international firm, 0 otherwise.       
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics – CONCERN, INTERNALLY, and EXTERNALLY 
 
Table 2 reports the mean levels (standard deviations) for CONCERN, INTERNALLY, and EXTERNALLY in each 
of the four experimental groups and for the main effects of RED FLAGS and PRESSURE. Our first dependent 
variable is the level of the manager’s concern over earnings quality (CONCERN). After reviewing the experimental 
materials, participants responded to the following prompt:   
“Based on your preliminary review, net income for Tecno in 2013 is:” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint labeled “Materially 
understated” and the right endpoint labeled “Materially overstated.”  The middle of the scale, which was 4, was 
labeled “Very accurate.” We measure CONCERN as the absolute value of the participant’s response from the 
midpoint of 4 (that earnings are very accurate). Our other dependent variables of interest are the likelihood that the 
manager will report concerns over earnings quality internally (INTERNALLY) and externally (EXTERNALLY). 
We measured INTERNALLY with the following question:   
“You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. To what extent would you 
discuss this concern with your Chief Executive Officer (CEO)?” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint labeled “Would not 
discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” 
We measured EXTERNALLY with the following question:   
“You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. If inside your company nothing 
was done in response to your concern, to what extent would you discuss this concern with your external 
auditor?” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint labeled “Would not 
discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.”  Participants responding “4” to CONCERN were coded 
as “1” or “Would not discuss” in the INTERNALLY and EXTERNALLY scales described above. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
RED FLAGS not present 
 
RED FLAGS present 
 
PRESSURE main effect 
PRESSURE 
low 
 
Condition 1 
CONCERN = 0.75 (0.76) 
INTERNALLY = 2.65 (1.66) 
EXTERNALLY = 2.71 (2.05) 
n = 48 
 
 
Condition 3 
CONCERN = 1.46 (1.13) 
INTERNALLY = 4.20 (1.93) 
EXTERNALLY = 4.40 (2.30) 
n = 50 
 
 
 
CONCERN = 1.11 (1.02) 
INTERNALLY = 3.44 (1.95) 
EXTERNALLY = 3.57 (2.33) 
n = 98 
PRESSURE 
high 
 
Condition 2 
CONCERN = 0.84 (0.65) 
INTERNALLY = 3.34 (2.20) 
EXTERNALLY = 2.92 (2.34) 
n = 50 
 
 
Condition 4 
CONCERN = 2.09 (0.94) 
INTERNALLY = 5.46 (1.87) 
EXTERNALLY = 4.16 (1.68) 
n = 56 
 
 
 
CONCERN = 1.50 (1.03) 
INTERNALLY = 4.46 (2.29) 
EXTERNALLY = 3.61 (2.08) 
n = 106 
RED 
FLAGS 
main effect 
CONCERN = 0.80 (0.70) 
INTERNALLY = 3.00 (1.97) 
EXTERNALLY = 2.85 (2.19) 
n = 98 
CONCERN = 1.79 (1.08) 
INTERNALLY = 4.87 (1.99) 
EXTERNALLY = 4.27 (1.99) 
n = 106 
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TABLE 3 
ANOVA: H1a and H1b Testing - CONCERNa 
 
 
Independent Variablesb 
 
 
df 
 
Mean 
square 
 
 
F 
 
 
pc 
RED FLAGS 1 48.74 61.481 <0.001 
PRESSURE 1 6.575 8.286 0.004 
RED FLAGS X PRESSURE 1 3.696 4.658 0.032 
Error 200 .793   
     
 
a CONCERN = After reviewing the experimental materials, participants responded to the 
following prompt:   
“Based on your preliminary review, net income for Tecno in 2013 is:” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Materially understated” and the right endpoint labeled “Materially overstated.”  The 
middle of the scale, which was 4, was labeled “Very accurate.” We measure CONCERN as the 
absolute value of the participant’s response from the midpoint of 4 (that earnings are very 
accurate).    
b RED FLAGS = Manipulated as present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were present) or 
not present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were not present). 
PRESSURE = Manipulated as high (ratio for percent return on assets just barely meets the 
required ratio as stated in the debt covenant) and low (ratio for percent return on assets easily 
exceeds the required ratio as stated in the debt covenant). 
c All tests are two-tailed. 
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TABLE 4 
MANOVA: INTERNALLY & EXTERNALLY – Full Samplea                                        
 
 
Independent Variablesb 
 
 
df 
 
Mean 
square 
 
 
F 
 
 
pc 
RED FLAGS (RF)           INTERNALLY 1 172.32 46.360 <0.001 
                                          EXTERNALLY 1 104.337 23.799 <0.001 
PRESSURE                     INTERNALLY 1 47.826 12.867 <0.001 
                                          EXTERNALLY 1 0.013 0.003 0.957 
RF X PRESSURE           INTERNALLY 1 4.306 1.158 0.283 
                                          EXTERNALLY 1 3.295 0.752 0.387 
Error                                INTERNALLY 199 3.717   
                                          EXTERNALLY 199 4.384   
     
     
 
a INTERNALLY = After reviewing the experimental materials, participants responded to the 
following prompt:   
“You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. To what extent 
would you discuss this concern with your Chief Executive Officer (CEO)?” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Would not discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” 
EXTERNALLY = After reviewing the experimental materials, participants responded to the 
following prompt:   
“You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. If inside your 
company nothing was done in response to your concern, to what extent would you discuss this 
concern with your external auditor?” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Would not discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” 
b RED FLAGS (RF) = Manipulated as present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were present) 
or not present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were not present). 
PRESSURE = Manipulated as high (ratio for percent return on assets just barely meets the 
required ratio as stated in the debt covenant) and low (ratio for percent return on assets easily 
exceeds the required ratio as stated in the debt covenant). 
c All tests are two-tailed. 
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TABLE 5 
MANOVA: INTERNALLY & EXTERNALLY – CFO Participantsa 
 
 
Independent Variablesb 
 
 
df 
 
Mean 
square 
 
 
F 
 
 
pc 
RED FLAGS (RF)           INTERNALLY 1 31.120 7.881 0.006 
                                          EXTERNALLY 1 16.717 3.487 0.066 
PRESSURE                     INTERNALLY 1 33.469 8.476 0.005 
                                          EXTERNALLY 1 0.764 0.159 0.691 
RF X PRESSURE           INTERNALLY 1 22.665 5.740 0.019 
                                          EXTERNALLY 1 1.403 0.293 0.590 
Error                                INTERNALLY 74 3.949   
                                          EXTERNALLY 74 4.794   
     
 
a INTERNALLY = After reviewing the experimental materials, participants responded to the 
following prompt:   
“You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. To what extent 
would you discuss this concern with your Chief Executive Officer (CEO)?” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Would not discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” 
EXTERNALLY = After reviewing the experimental materials, participants responded to the 
following prompt:   
“You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. If inside your 
company nothing was done in response to your concern, to what extent would you discuss this 
concern with your external auditor?” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Would not discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” 
b RED FLAGS (RF) = Manipulated as present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were present) 
or not present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were not present). 
PRESSURE = Manipulated as high (ratio for percent return on assets just barely meets the 
required ratio as stated in the debt covenant) and low (ratio for percent return on assets easily 
exceeds the required ratio as stated in the debt covenant). 
c All tests are two-tailed. 
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Figure 1: Description of the Study’s Four Experimental Conditions 
 
 RED FLAGS not present RED FLAGS present 
PRESSURE low Condition 1 
Accrual red flag not present 
NFM red flag not present 
Ratio for percent return on 
assets easily exceeds the 
required ratio as stated in the 
debt covenant  
Condition 3 
Accrual red flag present 
NFM red flag present 
Ratio for percent return on 
assets easily exceeds the 
required ratio as stated in the 
debt covenant  
PRESSURE high Condition 2 
Accrual red flag not present 
NFM red flag not present 
Ratio for percent return on 
assets just barely meets the 
required ratio as stated in the 
debt covenant  
Condition 4 
Accrual red flag present 
NFM red flag present 
Ratio for percent return on 
assets just barely meets the 
required ratio as stated in the 
debt covenant  
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Figure 2: Graph of Mean Responses to CONCERN 
 
  
 
CONCERN = After reviewing the experimental materials, participants responded to the 
following prompt:   
“Based on your preliminary review, net income for Tecno in 2013 is:” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Materially understated” and the right endpoint labeled “Materially overstated.” The 
middle of the scale, which was 4, was labeled “Very accurate.” We measure CONCERN as the 
absolute value of the participant’s response from the midpoint of 4 (earnings are very 
accurate).    
RED FLAGS = Manipulated as present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were present) or 
not present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were not present). 
PRESSURE = Manipulated as high (ratio for percent return on assets just barely meets the 
required ratio as stated in the debt covenant) and low (ratio for percent return on assets easily 
exceeds the required ratio as stated in the debt covenant). 
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Figure 3: Graph of Mean Responses to INTERNALLY – Full Sample 
 
  
 
INTERNALLY = After reviewing the experimental materials, participants responded to the 
following prompt:   
“You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. To what 
extent would you discuss this concern with your Chief Executive Officer (CEO)?” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint    
labeled “Would not discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” 
RED FLAGS = Manipulated as present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were present) or 
not present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were not present). 
PRESSURE = Manipulated as high (ratio for percent return on assets just barely meets the 
required ratio as stated in the debt covenant) and low (ratio for percent return on assets easily 
exceeds the required ratio as stated in the debt covenant). 
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Figure 4: Graph of Mean Response to EXTERNALLY – Full Sample 
 
  
 
EXTERNALLY = After reviewing the experimental materials, participants responded to the      
following prompt:   
“You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. If inside your 
company nothing was done in response to your concern, to what extent would you discuss 
this concern with your external auditor?” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Would not discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” 
RED FLAGS = Manipulated as present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were present) or 
not present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were not present). 
PRESSURE = Manipulated as high (ratio for percent return on assets just barely meets the 
required ratio as stated in the debt covenant) and low (ratio for percent return on assets easily 
exceeds the required ratio as stated in the debt covenant). 
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Figure 5: Graph of Mean Response to INTERNALLY – CFO Participants 
 
  
 
INTERNALLY = After reviewing the experimental materials, participants responded to the 
following prompt:   
“You stated that the 2013 net income for Tecno may be overstated/understated. To what 
extent would you discuss this concern with your Chief Executive Officer (CEO)?” 
Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 to 7, with the left endpoint 
labeled “Would not discuss” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely discuss.” 
RED FLAGS = Manipulated as present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were present) or 
not present (both the accrual and NFM red flag were not present). 
PRESSURE = Manipulated as high (ratio for percent return on assets just barely meets the 
required ratio as stated in the debt covenant) and low (ratio for percent return on assets easily 
exceeds the required ratio as stated in the debt covenant). 
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